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Abstract
This paper investigates the relations between dynamic parking prices and provision of parking information in a general
parking network. Travelers are provided with the real-time occupancy and pricing information to make their parking
choices. We ﬁrst formulate the parking choices under the User Equilibrium (UE) conditions using the Variational
Inequality (VI) approach. More importantly, the system optimal (SO) parking ﬂow pattern and SO parking prices are
also derived and solved eﬃciently using Linear Programming. Under SO, any two parking lots cannot be used at the
same time by travelers between more than one O-D pairs. The SO parking ﬂow pattern is not unique, which oﬀers
suﬃcient ﬂexibility for operators to achieve diﬀerent management objectives while keeping the ﬂow pattern optimal.
We show that any optimal ﬂow pattern can be achieved by lot-based parking pricing schemes that only depend on the
time or real-time occupancy. We ﬁnally solve both UE and SO in two numerical examples. The best system performance
is usually achieved by the parking prices such that the more preferred (convenient) lot should be used fully up to a certain
terminal occupancy of around 85%-95%. This essentially balances the parking congestion (namely cruising time) and
the convenience of preferred lots. We also obtain the SO prices from the SO solution set, to produce constant arrival
rates to each lot. This could mitigate the potential roadway congestion and queuing comparing to intensive arrival rates.
c© 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and/or peer review under responsibility of Delft University
of Technology
Keywords: Parking management, optimal parking pricing, parking information provision, parking occupancy, parking
cruising time
1. Introduction
The increasing demand of motorized vehicle and limited public space prompt severe parking issues in
modern cities. Parking can considerably inﬂuence travel behavior, and thus is one of the urban problems that
are top priorities for transportation planners. The objective of this paper is to improve parking management
by imposing optimal parking prices and providing parking information.
Parking plays a pivotal role in transportation industry and life quality for travelers. Studies show that a
typical car trip (if paying tolls or parking fees) pays parking fee for more than $5 on average, almost 70% of
the direct travel cost (Vuchic, 1999). The parking prices, availability and accessibility, the three components
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of parking facilities, considerably inﬂuence travelers’ decisions, when to leave, which mode to choose and
where to park. All those parking components should be optimized to eﬃciently manage the traﬃc so as
to build a sustainable transportation system. Undoubtedly, given the limited land-use for parking spaces in
most mega-cities, optimal parking pricing can be a ﬂexible and desirable tool for most system planners and
regulators.
Either parking pricing or information provision alone has been discussed intensively in the literature,
but their relationships are not fully understood yet. Most of the parking studies are descriptive and provide
qualitative guidelines for parking pricing in the steady-state context (e.g., Axhausen et al., 1994; Thompson
and Richardson, 1998; Vianna et al., 2004; Shoup, 2005; Litman, 2011). However, real-time dynamic pricing
in parking, one of the eﬃcient economics tools to balance real-time supply and demand, has gained less
attention than traditional real-time roadway tolls. This is partially due to the diﬃculty of acquiring real-time
supply data (namely parking information) and possible objection from travelers for not being able to obtain
such real-time information. However, the cutting-edge sensing and information technology make it possible
to obtain unprecedented information to overcome this diﬃculty. Equipped with parking sensors, modern
parking lots or blocks can provide real-time usage of parking facilities. The parking information, prices
and availability information for instance, can be sent through smartphones and GPS receivers to travelers in
real time. We certainly expect sensing and information provision help build more eﬃcient parking pricing
policies, as well as to resolve travelers’ parking issues.
Parking information provision has been implemented in the last two decades, but it alone is not working
eﬀectively as expected in many cases. In some cities, travelers are provided with parking information in
the form of variable message signs (VMS) or traﬃc radio broadcast. The real-time parking information is
usually regarding the number of available spaces in certain parking lots or blocks. Although such general
occupancy information in VMS may be used to optimize the parking reliability (Mei et al., 2012), both
empirical studies and simulation show that the beneﬁts of providing availability information alone may
be marginal in congested network conditions (e.g., Asakura and Kashiwadani, 1994). This is essentially
because when the parking spaces are scarce, the information alone does not deviate travelers from cruising
for parking (i.e. parking congestion), nor can it considerably change travelers’s choices in departure time,
routes or traﬃc modes. Clearly, this can certainly be improved by pricing. Therefore, it is essential to
combine both dynamic pricing and sensing in parking management, and pricing and information provision
jointly serve as the eﬃcient economics leverage.
Theoretical parking modeling is rare in the literature, and most of those models are in the steady-state
context or based on simpliﬁed (one-origin-one-destination or single roadway path) networks. Glazer (1992)
investigated two diﬀerent parking schemes, lump-sum parking fee and a fee per unit time, with their aﬀect
to the social welfare. Verhoef et al. (1995) conducted diagrammatic analysis on how parking aﬀects the
individual travel cost and modal split. Instead of assuming ﬁxed parking demands and constant travel cost
for all the travelers, Arnott and Rowse (1999) derived the optimum parking prices for a ring-road network
(also parking facilities) by adopting uniformly distribution parking demand. The optimal parking pricing
was further discussed by D’Acierno et al. (2006, 2011) between private cars and transit systems. Bifulco
(1993) modeled parking pricing for general transportation networks. He incorporated several parking types
and fees into the static traﬃc assignment for general networks. The eﬃcacy of parking policies is evaluated
for long-term planning purposes.
As for parking modeling in the dynamic context, Arnott et al. (1991) were among the ﬁrst to study dy-
namic user equilibrium with respect to parking choices. A special network is assumed where parking spaces
are continuously distributed along the (only) freeway connecting to the destination. The system dynamics
were embedded in the bottleneck model (Vickrey, 1969), a single-origin-single-destination network, to show
that parking fee alone can be eﬃcient in increasing social welfare (but not to the extent of roadway tolls).
This setup was further extended by Zhang et al. (2008) to include evening commute into consideration.
More recently, all three parking components, availability, accessibility and prices are examined based on the
bottleneck model where only two parking clusters are considered (Qian et al., 2011, 2012). However, the
provision of real-time parking information is not part of the system optimum setting and parking congestion
(parking searching time) is not modeled. In addition, parking cruising time has been calibrated using real
data (Axhausen et al., 1994) and simulation studies (Gallo et al., 2011).
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There is a great need to study the parking pricing and sensing for a general network, so that the optimal
parking pricing strategy can be set in coordination with the information provision in the real world. In fact,
a recent parking project in the City of San Francisco has started its exploration of optimal parking prices
by analyzing parking occupancy (SFMTA, 2011). In the SFPark project, sensors were installed in each of
the 5,000 parking spots to track when and where exactly those parking spaces are available. Wherever the
monthly aggregated parking occupancy increases (or decreases), the parking rate will be adjusted to increase
(or decrease) by 25 to 50 cents accordingly. Unfortunately, there is a lack of underlying theory for general
networks to connect real-time parking prices with the occupancy.
This paper models travelers’ parking choices by assuming that travelers are provided with precise park-
ing occupancy information and real-time parking prices. Qian and Rajagopal (2012) investigated the re-
lations between parking pricing and real-time parking occupancy based on User Equilibrium. The optimal
parking prices were further obtained in a close form for single-origin-single-destination traﬃc demand. This
paper adopts a similar setting for modeling parking choices as in Qian and Rajagopal (2012), but considers
general multi-origin-multi-destination traﬃc demands, and a more general pricing strategy. Each parking
lot/block could be used by traﬃc demands associated with any origins and/or destinations. We explicitly
model the dynamic parking prices and cruising time as part of the generalized travel cost. Both the infor-
mation provision and parking prices jointly serve as the eﬃcient way of managing the traﬃc. We obtain
the optimal dynamic parking pricing to minimize the total system cost. As a result, the optimal parking
prices with respect to the real-time occupancy can be obtained. This model can be implemented in practice
for a parking management system where the real-time occupancy is acquired from sensors and the prices
are adjusted in real-time. Such a system is expected to improve the eﬃciency of parking facilities, reduce
parking congestion, as well as to mitigate traﬃc congestion.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We ﬁrst present the basic model set-up and notations for
the parking network in Section 2. We then formulate the parking choices using User Equilibrium in Section
3 and solve it through Variational Inequality approach. It is followed by solving the System Optimum
(SO) ﬂow patterns in Section 4. We derive the optimality condition for a general network show that the
SO solution is not unique. A variety of parking control strategies can be embedded in the SO, and each is
realized by a certain SO pricing scheme. In section 5, two numerical experiments are provided, a network
with two origins and two destinations, and a real parking network of Stanford University campus. We
conclude the paper in Section 6.
2. The model
In this section, we present the general network and travelers’ generalized travel cost. We also discuss
the formula of parking searching time (also known as cruising time) and how it is embedded in our model.
2.1. The roadway network and model set-up
Suppose there are n parking lots/blocks in the network, numbered as {1, 2, . . . , n − 1, n} and illustrated
in Figure 1. Each of the parking lots/blocks represents a parking garage (structure) or a block of on-street
parking spaces. Those parking lots/blocks are connected to the automobile network by single roadway links
(the solid lines), or a series of roadway links and intersection nodes (the dash lines). Each parking lot i
has a capacity of Ki spaces and its parking fee is pi. We discretize the time horizon into T time periods,
{1, 2, . . . ,T }. Parking fee is dynamic and represented by pi(t) at time t. In addition, ki(t) represents the
number of eﬀectively occupied spaces in lot/block i at time t (to be elaborated later). ki(t) ≤ Ki, ∀i ∈
{1, 2, . . . , n},∀t ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,T }.
In transportation planning and network analysis, it is customary to use centroid nodes to represent traﬃc
analysis zones (TAZ), from/to which trips are assumed to have originated (Origins) or destined (Destina-
tions). In the network of Figure 1, suppose there are |R| origin nodes and |S | destination nodes where R and
S are the set of origin nodes and destination nodes, respectively. Each traveler departs an origin, chooses
a parking lot to park, and then walks to the destination. We use λrs(t) to denote the traveler departure rate
(i.e. traﬃc demand) at a departure time t for an O-D pair r − s, ∀r ∈ R,∀s ∈ S ,∀t ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,T }. The traﬃc
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Fig. 1. A general roadway network with parking facilities
demand is assumed to be pre-determined throughout this paper. λirs(t) denotes the traﬃc demand departing
the origin r at time t heading for destination s and choosing the parking lot/block i, ∀r ∈ R,∀s ∈ S ,∀i ∈
{1, 2, . . . , n},∀t ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,T }. The vector of λirs(t) reads Λ = {λirs(t)}i,r,s,t, also known as the parking ﬂow
pattern.
2.2. The general parking network
We assume that travelers departing from the same origin (or arriving the same destination) and using
the same parking lot choose the same roadway route (which is independent of the roadway congestion).
Therefore, the roadway network of Figure 1 can be easily transformed into the graph shown in Figure 2
to represent the general parking network. The new graph consists of three disjoint node sets, R, S and
{1, 2, . . . , n}, representing the set of origin nodes, destination nodes, and parking lots/blocks. Each of the
origins is connected to all the lots with driving links. Similarly, each destination is connected from all the
lots by walking links. The driving time from an origin node to any parking lot i, τOri, can be approximated
by ﬁnding the minimum travel cost between node r and i in the roadway network. On the other hand, the
walking time from a parking lot i to a destination node s , denoted by τDis, is approximately equal to the
distance between the two nodes divided by the average walking speed.
We do not explicitly model roadway congestion in terms of travel time in this paper. The roadway travel
time, i.e., driving time and walking time, is assumed to be relatively constant. Rather, we will be focus-
ing on the minimization of the total cost consisting of parking cruising time and the constant travel time.
This simpliﬁes the parking network, and thus can yield the analytical solution for the system optimum for
insights. The analytical solution allows us to explore the relations between parking pricing/information pro-
vision and travelers’ parking choices. The assumption is particularly reasonable when the general parking
network in Figure 2 describes parking spots connected by local arterial roads. Here the parking lots are not
far from travelers’ destination. In such a setting, travelers usually make parking choices when they are oﬀ
the freeway. It is then reasonable to assume that travelers with the same origin are subject to the same traﬃc
congestion on the freeway, and their driving time on the arterials to each parking lot/block is constant in a
relative sense.
Although the roadway congestion is not modeled in driving time, we are concerned about the arrival rates
to each lot which potentially aﬀect the roadway congestion. The intensive parking demand searching for
on-street parking creates additional congestion for through traﬃc; even for garage parking, overwhelming
arrival rates can produce a long queue on the street due to limited service rate at the parking entrance.
Therefore, we wish to use parking pricing and information provision to produce mild parking arrival rates,
so that this type of roadway congestion can be eliminated. The arrival rates to each lot indeed can be
controlled by the optimal parking pricing strategies.
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Fig. 2. A general parking network
2.3. Generalized travel cost
Now we deﬁne the generalized travel cost for travelers. They choose a parking lot by minimizing their
generalized travel cost. The composite travel time τirs of a traveler is deﬁned as the sum of the time from his
origin r to lot i and his walking time to the destination node s. Thus,
τirs = τ
O
ri + τ
D
is
If no fees are imposed in the parking lots and users have real time information about vacant spot locations,
then clearly the lot closest to s is the most desirable for any travelers heading for s.
The generalized travel cost of travelers between O-D pair rs choosing parking lot i and arriving at the
lot at time t, Cirs(t − τOri) (as t − τOri is his departure time from r), consists of the parking fee, composite travel
time and parking searching time,
Cirs(t − τOri) = pi(t) + α(τirs + fi(ki(t))) (1)
or equivalently, using t to represent the departure time,
Cirs(t) = pi(t + τ
O
ri) + α(τ
i
rs + fi(ki(t + τ
O
ri))) (2)
where α is the average value of time for the traveler population. fi(t) denotes the vehicle cruising time at
parking lot i for a traveler arriving at time t. In reality, the cruising time is dependent on many random
factors, such as the locations of vacant spaces, cruising routes, etc. Therefore, it is more appropriate to set
the individual cruising time as a random variable, while fi(t) here is the expected average vehicle cruising
time. This time is in fact closely related to the parking occupancy and the type of parking information
provided to the users. We will discuss more about the expected cruising time in a moment (later we use the
phase “cruising time” or “searching time” directly for simplicity purposes).
2.4. Parking searching time
Very few theoretical parking models consider parking cruising time, but it is a key component in parking
management and design. In this paper, we assume a general family of searching time functions, fi(ki(t)),
where ki(t) is the “eﬀective” occupancy at the arrival time t, deﬁned by the number of vehicles arriving prior
to t, i.e., the number of occupied spaces (also know as nominal occupancy) plus the number of vehicles
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arriving before t and cruising in lot i. The reason we adopt the eﬀective occupancy rather than the nominal
occupancy is because those arriving prior to t and cruising usually ﬁnd spots earlier than those arriving at t,
as a result of FIFO. The number of available spaces in the lot for a vehicle arriving at t to choose from is
actually less than the vacant spots observed at t. Therefore, we will use the eﬀective occupancy in the rest
of the paper.
The searching time is dependent on the dynamic parking occupancy and the type of parking information
provided to the travelers. Generally, the more parking information provided, the less cruising time travelers
are subject to. Now consider the case where travelers are provided with the number of vacant spaces in
each parking lot with, however, no exact spot location information (this is the most common case in the
current parking management system). A typical searching time function for travelers provided with overall
occupancy information is shown in Figure 3 (also reported by Axhausen et al. (1994) and Horni et al.
(2012)). The function is convex. It is rather ﬂat under low or medium occupancy where parking time
is approximately the same as the time spent in an empty lot, εi. However, the searching time increases
dramatically when the occupancy is high. Especially for the very last few spots, the searching time could be
very high. The cruising time is inﬁnite when the lot is fully occupied.


Occupancy
Time
1
εi
Fig. 3. A typical parking searching time function for travelers provided with occupancy information
Such expected searching time function may only exist when all travelers using this lot have full access
to the availability information (by online information system or day-to-day experience). When such infor-
mation is not available, the cruising time may be rather random. Travelers may randomly choose one lot,
cruise around a bit before he ﬁnds no vacancy and proceed to another lot (although there are vacant spots in
the ﬁrst one and they do not ﬁnd them!). In fact, the real-time availability information ensures a stabilized
parking choice in real time.
Thereafter we assume the parking searching time function is strictly monotone with respect to the occu-
pancy and is convex.
2.5. Notations
In addition, we use the following convention throughout the paper. Bolded letter is used to represent
a vector of real number. For instance, x is deﬁned as a list of real number xi, j, where each element has
subscripts i and j. This reads, x = {xi, j}i, j. In the vector, the elements xi, j are ordered in i ﬁrst (for the same
j), and then by j. The same convention also applies to other variables with more subscripts or superscripts.
The following notations are used throughout the paper. For the four indices, i, r, s, t, whenever we use ∀,
it means the index is chosen from the full set of that index.
i or j, index of a parking lot/block. i, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}
r, index of an origin node. r ∈ R
s, index of a destination node. s ∈ S
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t, index of a departure time interval. t ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,T }. t may also be used to represent the index of an
arrival time interval to a lot. In this case, t ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,T, T + 1, . . . ,T + maxr,i{τOri}}. It takes a traveler
who departs home at time T up to maxr,i{τOri} amount of time period to arrive his targeted parking lot, which
extends the time horizon. The former case is assumed in the text if not mentioned otherwise.
T ′ = T +maxr,i{τOri}. The time when the last traveler arrives a lot.
Λ = {λirs(t)}i,r,s,t, dynamic parking ﬂow pattern.
Γ = {λrs(t)}r,s,t, predetermined dynamic traﬃc demand.
Ξ = {λrs}r,s, static traﬃc demand. λrs = ∑Tt=1 λrs(t),∀r, s
Θ = {λirs}r,s,i, the total parking ﬂow. λirs(t) =
∑T
t=1 λ
i
rs,∀r, s, i
Φ = {λi(t)}i,t, lot arrival rate. Here t is the index of an arrival time interval to a lot.
P = {pi(t)}i,t, dynamic parking prices. Here t is the index of an arrival time interval to a lot.
C = {Cirs(t)}i,r,s,t, the vector of the generalized travel cost
A1, A2, A3, A4, A5, B,D, E, matrices in the optimization formulas, to be deﬁned in the text later.
F(Λ), a real value function of the parking ﬂow pattern Λ, to be deﬁned in the text later.
G(P), a real value function of the dynamic parking fee P, to be deﬁned in the text later.
The lot arrival rate Φ have the closed form by following the deﬁnition of the traﬃc demand directly
(∀t ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,T, T + 1, . . . ,T +maxr,i{τOri}}),
ki(t) =
∑
r
∑
s
t∑
m=τOri+1
λirs(m − τOri) (3)
λi(t) = ki(t) − ki(t − 1) =
∑
r
∑
s
λirs(t − τOri) (4)
In other words, by time t, the current parking lot is occupied by travelers whose arrival time to the parking
lot i is prior to t (i.e., whose departure time from the origin r is prior to t − τOri). The real-time eﬀective
occupancy is exactly the cumulative arrival rate to the lot.
3. User Equilibrium
We ﬁrst seek travelers’ parking choices and the corresponding parking ﬂow pattern in each lot by assum-
ing User Equilibrium travel behavior, for any given parking prices. Travelers choose their respective parking
spaces to minimize their travel costs, and eventually the traveler population achieves a User Equilibrium ﬂow
pattern deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition of User Equilibrium (UE). Via either online parking information system or suﬃcient (and sta-
bilized ) traveling experience, travelers are aware of three types of information at any time, the real-time
occupancy of each lot, the expected cruising time, and the real-time parking prices. Given the location,
capacity and time-varying prices of all parking lots, the eventual ﬂow patterns are such that, 1) the gener-
alized travel costs of all travelers are the same; 2) No traveler can unilaterally change his parking choice
and/or departure time choices to reduce his generalized travel cost.
The real-time occupancy information (via online information provision or day-to-day experience) helps
travelers choose the lot that yields the lowest travel cost for him in real time, which ensures the stabilized
ﬂow pattern. The UE deﬁned here is likely to occur in two situations. One is that after day-to-day experience,
travelers are familiar with the expected cruising time of those parking lots, and the UE is clearly a day-to-day
equilibrium. The other situation is that along with the occupancy information, travelers are also provided
with estimated cruising time for each lot. By assuming their parking choices are fully rational, i.e. they
always choose the lot with the least generalized travel cost, a UE may also be achieved. Any change in
the pricing or parking facilities may lead to a new UE, but it takes some days to become stabilized for the
former case, while the UE could be instantaneously achievable for the latter case.
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Mathematically, the UE condition reads in the following form. Given a feasible parking ﬂow pattern
{Λ ≥ 0|∑i λirs(t) = λrs(t),∀r, s, t},
λirs(t) > 0 ⇒ Cirs(t) = πrs(t),∀r, s, i, t (5)
λirs(t) = 0 ⇒ Cirs(t) ≥ πrs(t),∀r, s, i, t
The mathematical formulation states that for any travelers departing at time t between O-D pair rs, if choos-
ing lot/block i, then his travel cost Cirs(t) must attain the minimum of the cost of all the travelers departing at
time t between O-D pair rs, denoted by πrs(t). If none of those travelers choose to park in lot/block i, then
the corresponding travel cost of using lot/block i is greater or equal to the minimum travel cost πrs(t).
The UE condition 5 can be cast into a variational inequality (VI) problem. Deﬁne C as the vector of the
travel cost of all the travelers, i.e., C = {Cirs(t)}i,r,s,t
Proposition 3.1. User Equilibrium parking ﬂow pattern Λ∗ is a solution of VI(Ω,C), i.e. ﬁnd Λ∗ ∈ Ω such
that
(Λ − Λ∗)TC(Λ∗) ≥ 0 ∀Λ ∈ Ω (6)
where Ω = {Λ ≥ 0|∑i λirs(t) = λrs(t),∀r, s, t} is the feasible solution set.
Proof. Let us now prove that solving VI(Ω,C) is equivalent to the UE condition 5.
Suppose Λ∗ is a solution of VI(Ω,C) and it does not satisfy condition 5. Then there exists (r′, s′, i′, t′)
such that λ∗i′r′ s′ (t
′) > 0 and C∗i′r′ s′ (t
′) > πr′ s′ (t′). We then construct Λ¯ in such a way that all the elements equal
to those of Λ∗ except for λ¯i′r′ s′ (t
′) = λ∗i′r′ s′ (t
′) −  ( is a small positive number) and λ¯i′′r′ s′ (t′) = λ∗i
′′
r′ s′ (t
′) + ,
where i′′ is where Ci′′r′ s′ (t
′) attains the minimum travel cost πr′ s′ (t′). It is then clear that Λ¯ ∈ Ω, but
(Λ¯ − Λ∗)TC(Λ∗) = (πr′ s′ (t′) −C∗i′r′ s′ (t′)) < 0
Therefore, by contradiction, if Λ∗ is a solution of VI(Ω,C), then it must satisfy condition 5.
On the other hand, let Λ∗ satisfy condition 5. Then for ∀Λ¯ ∈ Ω,
λ∗irs(t)(C
∗i
rs(t) − πrs(t)) = 0,∀, r, s, t, i
λ¯irs(t)(C
∗i
rs(t) − πrs(t)) ≥ 0,∀, r, s, t, i
Therefore, ∀Λ¯ ∈ Ω,
(λ¯irs(t) − λ∗irs(t))(C∗irs(t) − πrs(t)) ≥ 0,∀, r, s, t, i
which is exactly the deﬁnition of VI(Ω,C).
Proposition 3.2. If the searching time function fi is strictly monotone for any lot i, then User Equilibrium
parking ﬂow pattern Λ∗ exists and is unique.
Proof. We ﬁrst consider the generalized travel cost function. Cirs(t) is a function of up-to-date occupancy
ki(t) as indicated by Equation 1 , which is furthermore determined in Equation 3 by the parking ﬂow pattern.
By the assumption that the searching time fi is continuous and strictly monotone with respect to ki, we
conclude that C is continuous on Λ and is strictly monotone with respect to Λ.
The existence and uniqueness of VI(Ω,C) is then followed by the fact that Ω is nonempty, closed,
bounded and convex, and C is continuous and strictly monotone (Konnov, 2007).
Several algorithms have been developed to solve for VI(Ω,C) (e.g., Nagurney, 1993; Konnov, 2007).
One of the most widely used is the projection-based algorithm. We ﬁrst introduce the regularized merit
function (Konnov, 2007),
φθ(x) = max
Λ∈Ω
{(x − Λ)TC(Λ) − ||Λ − x||
2
2θ
} (7)
Proposition 3.3. Λ∗ is a solution to VI(Ω,C) if and only if Λ∗ solves maxx∈Ω φθ(x).
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Proof. Since we have shown that C is continuously diﬀerentiable and strictly monotone, the proposition
directly follows Konnov (2007) (p. 173, Proposition 13.1).
ProjΩ(Λ − δC(Λ)) − Λ (for ∀δ > 0) is a strict ascent direction for φθ(Λ) whenever Λ is not a solution
to VI(Ω,C). It also measures the optimality condition, i.e. it converges to zero as the projection goes on.
Furthermore, we can use the following gap function to examine its convergence to a true UE solution,
n∑
i=1
∑
r
∑
s
λirs(t)(C
i
rs(t) − πrs(t)) (8)
The gap function is expected to converge to zero when the UE solution is achieved.
We have formulated the UE parking choices using the variational inequality method, and proposed an
eﬃcient projection-based algorithm to solve it with guaranteed convergence. While it does not yield any
closed form for the UE parking ﬂow pattern, its existence and uniqueness is proven.
To see the UE parking choices in a more intuitive way, in the beginning of the commuting time when
very few spaces in the parking lots are occupied, travelers always choose the lots that are most desirable
(closest to their destination or cheapest). As time goes on, the expected parking cruising time increases for
each parking lot. The increase may diﬀer considerably among those lots, dependent on the arrival rates to
each lot. Travelers may start to switch to other parking lots (rather than the one they preferred in the ﬁrst
place) by making trade-oﬀ between the access time (convenience) and the parking searching time (parking
congestion). Note that the change in parking searching time for each lot is a result of parking choices of
previous travelers.
4. Optimal parking ﬂow and pricing
Under UE behavior assumption, diﬀerent parking prices lead to diﬀerent UE ﬂow patterns, and thus dif-
ferent network performance, represented by the total travel cost (including the cruising time and composite
travel time). The parking fees collected are generally not considered in the total cost. We are most concerned
about the System Optimal (SO) pricing schemes that can lead to the minimal total cost. The resultant UE
ﬂow pattern under the SO prices is referred to as the SO ﬂow pattern.
4.1. Formulation
To solve the SO parking pricing, we seek the optimal parking ﬂow pattern that minimizes the total
system cost. The optimization problem is,
min
Λ
TC = α
∫ κi
0
fi(x)dx + α
∑
r∈R
∑
s∈S
n∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
(τOri + τ
D
is)λ
i
rs(t) (9a)
s.t.
n∑
i=1
λirs(t) = λrs(t),∀t, r, s (9b)
κi =
∑
r∈R
∑
s∈S
T∑
t=1
λir,s(t),∀i (9c)
κi ≤ Ki,∀i (9d)
λirs(t) ≥ 0,∀r, s, t, i (9e)
where κi is the number of spaces ﬁnally occupied in lot i, referred as “terminal occupancy” in the rest of the
paper.
The total system cost (TC) is the sum of total cruising time for all the travelers from all the O-D pairs
and their total composite travel time. All the parking fees collected by the lots are generally considered as
part of the social welfare, and thus are not included in the total system cost. They are either re-distributed to
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the public by using those revenue to subsidize the public transit, or are part of the social beneﬁts for parking
operators. We want to ﬁnd the optimal parking ﬂow pattern Λ that minimizes the total cost. Equation 9b
states the ﬂow feasibility condition, i.e. the sum of the parking ﬂow with respect to any O-D pair rs for
all lots is equal to the total commuting ﬂow between r − s at any departure time t, and the ﬂow must be
nonnegative in Inequality 9e. Equation 9c computes the terminal occupancy of each lot by aggregating the
time-dependent demand over time, and the terminal occupancy is smaller or equal to the parking capacity
in Inequality 9d.
We will ﬁrst solve the optimal terminal parking occupancy {κi}i, which is followed by the optimal ﬂow
pattern and parking prices in the following subsections.
4.2. Optimal terminal parking occupancy
Proposition 4.2.1. The optimal terminal parking occupancy {κi}i in the optimization problem 9 can be
solved by applying UE static traﬃc assignment in the general parking network (Figure 2). The static traﬃc
demand is Ξ = {λrs}r,s. {τOri}r,i and {τDis}i,s are the constant travel time for links connecting to/from the parking
lots. { fi(·)}i serve as the variable link performance functions of those parking lots (seeing lots as links in
Figure 2).
Proof. This proposition can be shown by equalizing the marginal travel cost (MTC) of the entire parking
network for all travelers.
The MTC of time t between O-D pair rs and using lot i is the sum of additional system cost caused by
sending an additional traveler departing at time t between O-D pair rs and using lot i. Such a traveler can
increase the total searching time by fi(κi) and its own composite travel time τOri + τ
D
si. For any travelers with
departure time t between any O-D pair rs, the MTC of using parking lot i should be identical, if lot i is being
used. We further observe that MTC consists of the free-ﬂow travel time and the marginal parking searching
time, fi(κi), and thus is independent of departure time t. Therefore, we may omit the time dimension, and
MTC reads,
λirs > 0⇒
MTCrs
α
= τOri + τ
D
si + fi(κi),∀r, s, i ∈ Lrs (10)
where Lrs ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} is the set of parking lots being used by demand between O-D pair rs during the
analysis horizon. On the other hand, if no travelers from O-D pair rs use lot i, then the corresponding
composite travel time and searching time should be greater than the MTC of using any of the lot by the
deﬁnition of SO.
λirs = 0⇒
MTCrs
α
< τOri + τ
D
si + fi(κi),∀r, s, i ∈ Lrs (11)
The optimality conditions 10 and 11 are essentially equivalent to the UE condition of assigning demand
{λrs}r,s to the parking network, by seeing MTCrsα as the minimum cost between O-D pair rs.
Thus, the well-known UE static traﬃc assignment (STA) problem can be applied here to solve for the
optimal terminal parking occupancy. In the UE STA, all the origin connectors (to the lots) and destination
connectors (from the lots) have the constant link cost τOri and τ
D
si respectively, and each of the parking lots
are treated as a link with the link performance function fi(·).
In addition, Inequality 9d is satisﬁed when solving UE-STA by choosing appropriate parking searching
time. For instance, the searching function fi shown in Equations ?? and ?? are such that the searching time
of the very last parking space is suﬃciently large. Therefore, the terminal occupancy solved by UE-STA
will not exceed the capacity if the parking lots can accommodate all the travel demand, i.e.
∑n
i=1 Ki >∑
rs λrs.
Proposition 4.2.1 allows us to solve the optimal terminal parking occupancy eﬃciently without necessar-
ily working on the optimization problem 9 directly. A conventional method to solve UE-STA is Frank-Wolfe
algorithm (LeBlanc et al., 1975). In this case, due to the features of the parking network where only parking
lots have variable link performance function and other links are connectors with constant travel time, we can
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revise the F-W method in a more eﬃcient way, i.e., the shortest path component in the original algorithm
can be replaced by simply ﬁnding the optimal parking choices as described in the following Algorithm 1.
Here we use f νi to represent the terminal parking searching time of lot i in the ν-th iteration, and x
ν
ri and x
ν
is
to represent the ﬂow on the origin connectors and destination connectors in the ν-th iteration, respectively.
0. Initialization; f 0i = fi(0),∀i. κ0i = 0,∀i. x0ri = 0,∀r, i. x0is = 0,∀i, s. ν = 1;
foreach each O-D pair rs do
ﬁnd j = argmini{τOri + τDsi + f 0i };
κ0j = κ
0
j + λrs ; x
0
r j = x
0
r j + λrs; x
0
js = x
0
js + λrs ;
end
1. Update searching time; f νi = fi(κ
ν
i ),∀i;
2. Find the descent direction y. yi = 0,∀i. yri = 0,∀r, i. yis = 0,∀i, s ;
foreach each O-D pair rs do
ﬁnd j = argmini{τOri + τDsi + f νi };
y j = y j + λrs ; yr j = yr j + λrs; y js = y js + λrs ;
end
3. Find the step size μ (using bi-section method), such that
∑
r,i
(yri − xνri)τOri +
∑
i,s
(yis − xνis)τDis +
∑
i
(yi − f νi ) fi(κνi + μ(yi − κνi )) = 0
4. Update the solution; κν+1i = κ
ν
i + μ(yi − κνi ),∀i;
xν+1ri = x
ν
ri + μ(yri − xνri),∀r, i; xν+1is = xνis + μ(yis − xνis),∀i, s;
5. Check the convergence; If |κν+1i − κνi | <  ( is a small positive real number), then terminate;
Otherwise, ν = ν + 1; go to step 1;
Algorithm 1: A revised F-W method to solve for optimal terminal occupancy
Proposition 4.2.2. If the searching time function fi is strictly monotone for any lot i, then the optimal
terminal parking occupancy {κi}i exists and is unique.
Proof. This proposition is immediately followed by the fact that any traveler must use one of the parking
lot and the parking searching time of each lot is strictly monotone. Since the path travel cost in the UE-
STA is strictly monotone, the ﬂow, i.e. {κi}i in this case, exists and is unique. Note that the ﬂow on the
origin/destination connectors may not be unique.
In fact, we show that the optimal terminal occupancy for each lot is independent of the value of time α.
This is essentially because each traveler evaluates the time in the same monetary cost and the direct expen-
diture (parking fee) is not considered as part of the total cost. In other words, if we assume a homogeneous
population, this property allows us to determine the optimal parking usage without necessarily knowing the
population value of time.
4.3. Optimal total parking ﬂow
Given the optimal terminal parking occupancy {κ∗i }i, the optimization problem 9 is then equivalent to the
following optimization problem (we let dirs = τ
O
ri + τ
D
is),
min
{λirs}
∑
r∈R
∑
s∈S
n∑
i=1
dirsλ
i
rs (12a)
s.t.
∑
r∈R
∑
s∈S
λirs = κ
∗
i ,∀i (12b)
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n∑
i=1
λirs =
T∑
t=1
λrs(t),∀r, s, (12c)
λirs ≥ 0,∀r, s, i (12d)
The optimization problem 12 solves for the optimal total parking ﬂow Θ∗ = {λ∗irs}r,s,i over the entire analysis
horizon. Any time-varying parking ﬂow pattern Λ ≥ 0 that satisﬁes the following feasibility conditions is
optimal,
T∑
t=1
λirs(t) = λ
∗i
rs,∀r, s, i (13a)
n∑
i=1
λirs(t) = λrs(t),∀r, s, t (13b)
Let us ﬁrst focus on solving the total parking ﬂow Θ . We now write it in matrix notation. Let Im denote
the m-by-m identity matrix, and Om the m-tuples vector with each element being 1. κ∗ denotes the vector of
the optimal terminal occupancy. Deﬁne,
B =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
In In . . . In
On
On
. . .
On
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
(n+|R||S |)×|R||S |n
b1 =
(
κ∗
Ξ
)
(n+|R||S |)×1
D = {dirs}r,s,i
The optimization problem 12 reads in its matrix notation,
min
Θ
D ·Θ (14a)
s.t. B ·Θ = b1 (14b)
Θ ≥ 0 (14c)
The linear program 14 is usually under-determined since n+ |R||S | << |R||S |n. Thus, its optimal solution
may not be unique. We here explore its optimal solution set.
Proposition 4.3.1. Suppose Θ∗0 is a solution of the linear progra 14. Do a singular value decomposition
for, (
DT
B
)
= UΣVT
where where U is a (n+ |R||S |+ |R||S |n)× (|R||S |n) matrix, Σ is an diagonal matrix with (|R||S |n) nonnegative
real numbers on the diagonal, and VT is a (|R||S |n) × (|R||S |n) real matrix (with orthogonal columns). Let
m be the number of non-zero diagonal elements. If |R||S |n − m ≤ 0, then the linear program 14 has a
unique solution Θ∗0. Otherwise, we can choose the last |R||S |n − m columns of V, denoted by V˜. Search any
(|R||S |n − m)-tuples vector γ such that,
V˜γ ≥ −Θ∗0
and V˜γ + Θ∗0 is also an optimal solution of the linear program 14.
Proof. Suppose Θ∗0 + z is also a solution of the linear program 14. Then,
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
DTz = 0
Bz = 0
Θ∗0 + z ≥ 0
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For any z in the basis of V˜, i.e., z = V˜γ, by the deﬁnition of V˜ in the proposition,
(
DT
B
)
z =
(
DT
B
)
V˜γ = UΣVTV˜γ = 0
which completes the proof.
By Proposition 4.3.1, we are able to ﬁnd any optimal total parking ﬂow Θ∗. It is not unique in most of
the cases. This will be further discussed in the next subsection, as we will see the optimal dynamic parking
ﬂow pattern is not unique as well.
4.4. Optimal dynamic parking ﬂow pattern
Next we can solve for the optimal dynamic parking ﬂow pattern Λ∗.
Proposition 4.4.1. The optimal parking ﬂow pattern Λ that solves the optimization problem 9 exists and is
not unique.
Proof. It is easy to show that the optimization problem 12 combining with the feasibility condition 13 de-
termines the optimal parking ﬂow pattern that solves the optimization problem 9. For the optimization
problem 12, the feasible set determined by Equations 12b, 12c and 12d is nonempty, since κ∗i =
∑
r
∑
s λ
i
rs
and λrs(t) > 0,∀t. Thus, the linear programming of the optimization problem 12 can always attain a min-
imum with at least one solution Θ∗. Clearly, given any Θ∗, Λ = {λirs(t)}r,s,t,i determined by condition 13 is
not unique.
Given an optimal total parking ﬂow Θ∗, the feasible condition of the optimal Λ∗ reads (writing the
feasibility condition 13 in matrix notation),
(
A1
A2
)
Λ =
(
Γ
Θ∗
)
(15a)
Λ ≥ 0 (15b)
where Γ denotes the vector form of the parking demand {λrs(t)}r,s,t, and,
A1 =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
On
On
. . .
On
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
|R||S |T×|R||S |nT
, A2 =
(
I|R||S |n I|R||S |n · · · I|R||S |n
)
|R||S |n×|R||S |nT
Since the optimal dynamic parking ﬂow pattern Λ∗ is not unique, we could further determine an optimal
one according to other traﬃc management objectives. Consequently, we can propose a generic manage-
ment objective F(Λ) to ﬁnally choose the most desirable optimal parking ﬂow pattern, subject to feasibility
conditions 15.
min
Λ
F(Λ) (16a)
s.t.
(
A1
A2
)
Λ =
(
Γ
Θ∗
)
(16b)
Λ ≥ 0 (16c)
Note that some rows in the composite matrix A1 and A2 are redundant, since
∑
i λ
i
rs =
∑
t λrs(t),∀r ∈ R, s ∈ S .
In real implementation, we should remove the last |R||S | rows of matrix A1 to ensure every row in the
composite matrix (A1 and A2) is linearly independent.
Those objectives F(·) include minimizing roadway congestion, temporal or spacial restriction on parking
ﬂow, priority parking and so forth. For example, parking operators may reserve the usage of a particular lot
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i particularly for travelers from certain origins (or to certain destinations). In another example, the operator
may be concerned about the roadway congestion caused by queuing at the parking entrance and parking
cruising (the rationale is discussed in Section 2.2). The roadway congestion is not explicitly considered in
the SO formulation, but it could be reduced by carefully choosing appropriate arrival rates Φ = {λi(t)}i,t. A
set of desirable arrival rates could be,
λi(t) =
κ∗i
T +maxr,i{τOri}
,∀i, t ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,T ′} (17)
Given the terminal parking occupancy, the minimal queue at the parking entrance is achieved by setting a
constant arrival rate. In this case, the objective F(·) reads,
min
Λ
||A3Λ − Φ||2 (18)
where, A3 is a nT ′ × |R||S |nT matrix. For each row of A3 (i.e. given a pair of i and t), the elements
corresponding to λirs(t − τOri) is one for all the OD pair r − s, and other elements are zeros.
To sum up, we need to solve two optimization problems sequentially, Problem 14 and Problem 16, in
order to ﬁnd the most desirable SO parking ﬂow pattern. Both problems 14 and 16 require large-scale
algorithms for general networks. The dimension of the decision variable Λ is |R||S |nT , but it could be
reduced considerably during the solution procedure. If we implement the simplex method for solving the
linear program 14, then the solutionΘ∗ is usually sparse (i.e., most of the elements are zeros) for large-scale
networks. In addition, notice that
λ∗irs = 0⇒ λ∗irs(t) = 0,∀t
For any O-D pair rs and parking lot i such that λ∗irs = 0, T amount of the elements in Λ could be eliminated.
The ﬁnal dimension in Λ is much smaller than |R||S |nT . Furthermore, large-scale iterative algorithms meth-
ods for solving sparse rectangular systems, as shown in Problem 16, have been developed, such as LSQR or
LSMR.
4.5. Optimum parking pricing schemes
The optimal parking ﬂow pattern Λ∗ can be realized by charging optimal parking prices. The optimal
parking prices are such that the generalized travel costs (inclusive of the parking fee) of any travelers from
the same O-D pair and with the same departure time are identical, and meanwhile the parking ﬂow pattern
is optimal as derived before. In general, two types of parking prices can be charged in each parking lot, and
their deﬁnitions are given as below.
Deﬁnition 4.5.1. A dynamic parking pricing scheme is path-based, if for each lot, the parking fee is charged
by travelers’ O-D and their arrival time to the lot.
Deﬁnition 4.5.2. A dynamic parking pricing scheme is lot-based or link-based, if for each lot, the parking
fee is charged by travelers’ arrival time to the lot, regardless of their origins and destinations.
Note that since the parking fees are imposed with respect to travelers’ arrival time, the discretized time
interval of parking fee is such that t ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,T, T + 1, . . . ,T ′}.
Clearly, there always exists a path-based parking pricing scheme to achieve the optimal parking ﬂow
pattern. To see this, for ∀r, s, t, i, we have,
λ∗irs(t) > 0⇒ dirs + fi(ki(t + τOr,i)) + pirs(t + τOri) = πrs(t) (19a)
λ∗irs(t) = 0⇒ dirs + fi(ki(t + τOr,i)) + pirs(t + τOri) ≥ πrs(t) (19b)
πrs(t) = arg min
i∈{1,2,...,n}
[
dirs + fi(ki(t + τ
O
r,i)) + p
i
rs(t + τ
O
ri)
]
(19c)
The time-varying searching time fi(ki(t + τOr,i)) is determined by the optimal pattern ﬂow pattern Λ
∗. There-
fore, solving Equation 19 for each O-D pair rs and departure time t always yields a set of feasible path-based
parking prices {pirs(t)}r,s,i,t.
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Though the path-based optimal parking pricing is always feasible, it may not be realistic. This is due to
the diﬃculty of tracking the origin or destination of each vehicle upon the arrival. The link-based parking
pricing scheme is what most parking lots adopt currently. Being easily implementable and realistic, the
link-based parking fees seem to lose the ability of balancing travelers’ parking choices between any O-D
pairs, as compared to the path-based fees. A question naturally arises whether such a link-based pricing
scheme can also achieve the SO parking ﬂow pattern? Fortunately, the answer is positive by the following
proposition.
Proposition 4.5.1. Any optimal parking ﬂow pattern Λ∗ can be realized by a lot-based parking pricing
scheme P = {pi(t)}i,t.
Note that the composite travel time matrix D is path-dependent. Before proving 4.5.1, we ﬁrst show and
prove the following lemma.
Lemma 4.5.1. Any optimal solution Λ∗ must satisfy, for ∀t, t′ ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,T }, r, r′ ∈ R, s, s′ ∈ S , i, j ∈
{1, 2, . . . , n}, i  j, {
λir′ s′ (t)λ
j
rs(t′) = 0 if dirs − d jrs < dir′ s′ − d jr′ s′
λirs(t)λ
j
r′ s′ (t
′) = 0 if dirs − d jrs > dir′ s′ − d jr′ s′
(20)
Proof. Let us examine the linear program 12. Attach Lagrange multiplier ρi, μrs, virs to the constrains 12b,
12c and 12d, respectively. The ﬁrst-order KKT condition reads,
∂L
∂λirs
= dirs + ρi + μrs − virs = 0, λirsvirs = 0,∀r, t, i
First of all, we must have at least one of the four, λir′ s′ ,λ
j
rs,λirs and λ
j
r′ s′ , to be zero. If all these four terms
are non-zero, then vir′ s′ = v
j
rs = virs = v
j
r′ s′ = 0 by the complementary slackness condition. This results in
dirs − d jrs = dir′ s′ − d jr′ s′ from the KKT condition.
Without loss of generality, let λirs = 0, then λ
i
rs(t) = 0,∀t and virs > 0. If one of the two, λir′ s′ or λ jrs is
zero, then condition 20 holds. Thus, let us consider the case where both λir′ s′ and λ
j
rs are non-zero. Then,
vir′ s′ = 0, v
j
rs = 0. We shall have dirs − virs − d jrs = dir′ s′ − d jr′ s′ + v jr′ s′ . Hence, dirs − d jrs > dir′ s′ − d jr′ s′ . Similarly,
we can also show that if λir′ s′ = 0 or λ
j
rs = 0, then dirs − d jrs < dir′ s′ − d jr′ s′ .
Now we provide the proof of Proposition 4.5.1.
Proof. The lot-based parking pricing scheme {pi(t)}i,t must satisfy that, for ∀i, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, i  j,∀r, s, t
λirs(t) > 0, d
i
rs + fi(ki(t + τ
O
r,i)) +
pi(t + τOri)
α
= d jrs + f j(k j(t + τOr, j)) +
p j(t + τOr j)
α
⇒
λ
j
rs(t) ≥ 0 (21a)
λirs(t) > 0, d
i
rs + fi(ki(t + τ
O
r,i)) +
pi(t + τOri)
α
< d jrs + f j(k j(t + τOr, j)) +
p j(t + τOr j)
α
⇒
λ
j
rs(t) = 0 (21b)
Notice that the searching time fi and price pi are lot-based, while the composite travel time d is path-
based. Therefore, the lot-based parking prices are constrained as follows. For any ∀t, t′, r, r′, s, s′, i, j such
that i  j, t + τOr, j = t
′ + τOr′, j and t + τ
O
r,i = t
′ + τOr′,i, we have (use index r, s, t for condition 21a and index
r′, s′, t′ for condition 21b),
dirs − d jrs < dir′ s′ − d jr′ s′ ⇒ λirs(t)λ jr′ s′ (t′) = 0 (22)
Similarly, if we use index r′, s′, t for condition 21a and index r, s, t′ for condition 21b, then we have,
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dirs − d jrs > dir′ s′ − d jr′ s′ ⇒ λir′ s′ (t)λ jrs(t′) = 0 (23)
Clearly, the required conditions 22 and 23 are guaranteed by the linear program 12 as a result of Lemma
4.5.1.
Lemma 4.5.1 shows that the condition 20 should be added to the optimization problem 16 as a new
constrain. Only if this additional constraint is enforced, the resultant optimal parking ﬂow pattern can be
achieved by lot-based parking pricing schemes. Recall that we need to solve two optimization problems
sequentially, Problem 14 and Problem 16, for an SO parking ﬂow pattern. We show that by Proposition
4.5.1, this additional constrain should be automatically guaranteed when we solve the linear program 14
(i.e. the matrix form of the linear program 12).
The conditions 21a and 21b allow us to solve for the optimal lot-based parking prices.
For travelers with departure time ∀t and parking choice ∀i, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, i < j, we build equalities
and inequalities as follows,
If there exists at least an O-D pair rs such that λirs(t) > 0, λ
j
rs(t) > 0, i.e., both lots i and j are used, then
for any of such r − s,
p j(t + τOr j) − pi(t + τOri)
α
= fi(ki(t + τOr,i)) − f j(k j(t + τOr, j)) + dirs − d jrs (24)
If no O-D pair is used by both lots, and lot i is used for some r− s, i.e., λ jrs(t) = 0,∀r, s, and ∃r, s, λirs(t) >
0, then for any of such r − s,
p j(t + τOr j) − pi(t + τOri)
α
≥ fi(ki(t + τOr,i)) − f j(k j(t + τOr, j)) + dirs − d jrs (25)
If no O-D pair is used by both lots, and lot j is used for some r− s, i.e., λirs(t) = 0,∀r, s, and ∃r, s, λ jrs(t) >
0, then for any of such r − s,
p j(t + τOr j) − pi(t + τOri)
α
≤ fi(ki(t + τOr,i)) − f j(k j(t + τOr, j)) + dirs − d jrs (26)
Again, we write Equalities 24 and Inequalities 25 and 26 in the matrix form,
A4P = αb4 (27a)
A5P ≥ αb5 (27b)
P ≥ 0 (27c)
where LHS of Equalities 24 constitutes the sparse matrix A4. Each row of A4 corresponds to a set of
t, i, j(i < j), r, s where Equalities 24 holds, and the elements corresponding to pj(t+ τOr j) and pi(t+ τ
O
ri) is set
to 1 and -1, respectively. Similarly, the LHS of Inequalities 25 and 26 constitute the sparse matrix A5. The
RHS of Equalities 24 and Inequalities 25 and 26 constitutes the vector b4 and b5, respectively.
Before solving the linear system 27, the searching time fi(t),∀i, t can be obtained by computing the
up-to-date occupancy ki(t) based on the optimal ﬂow pattern Λ∗, which reads,
ki(t) =
∑
r
∑
s
t∑
m=τOri+1
λ∗irs(m − τOri) (28)
Note that here the index t represents the arrival time to the lot, and thus ranges from 1 to T ′.
Clearly, conditions 27 constitute an under-determined system. While any parking prices satisfying the
conditions 27 are optimal, other criteria (denoted by functionG(·)) on selecting the prices should be imposed
to make it realistic. For instance, we set,
G(P) = ||EP − e||2 (29)
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Let E = InT and e = 0, we are minimizing the norm of the price vector, namely the overall SO lot-based
price values are set to be minimal. If we set E = InT and e monotonically increasing, then we expect the SO
lot-based prices to approach the pattern of linear increasing during the peak time. We may also let the SO
prices approach a desired overall average price p by setting E = InT and e = pOnT .
In general, we solve the following optimization problem to obtain the optimal lot-based parking prices,
min
P
G(P) (30a)
s.t. Conditions 27(a), (b) and (c) (30b)
where conditions 27(a) and (b) are built on the optimal parking ﬂow pattern Λ∗.
4.6. Discussions on the optimal solution
We further explore some interesting results accompanying the SO formulas.
If for i, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, i  j, r, s, t, and travelers between O-D pair rs and departing at time t choose
both lots i and j, then,
αdirs + α fi(ki(t + τ
O
r,i)) + pi(t + τ
O
ri) = αd
j
rs + α f j(k j(t + τOr, j)) + p j(t + τ
O
r j) (31)
As we can see, travelers departing at time t make parking choices based on the real-time occupancy and
prices up to his arrival time t + τOr,i. Provision of parking information plays an important role in determining
the parking choices, and thus the SO ﬂow pattern.
Diﬀerentiate both sides with respect to t, we obtain (where ∗ denotes the optimal solution),
p∗i (t + τ
O
r,i) − p∗i (t + τOr,i − 1) + α
∂ fi(k∗i (t + τ
O
r,i))
∂ki
λ∗i (t) (32)
= p∗j(t + τ
O
r, j) − p∗j(t + τOr, j − 1) + α
∂ f j(k∗j(t + τ
O
r, j))
∂k j
λ∗j(t)
Without loss of generality, we can set a constant parking fee for lot j during the time period t+τOt, j. Equation
32 describes the relations between optimal parking fee and the real-time occupancy. Suppose no traveler
is assigned to use a lot by the optimal pattern currently (i.e.,λ∗i (t) = 0), but it will be used later on. Then
its optimal price change is equal to the marginal searching time of another lot being used during this time
period, and this marginal searching time is equalized among all the lots currently being used. During this
time interval, a lot with less occupancy is assigned with more travelers.
Provided that a lot is used during a time period, the change in the optimal price (lot-based) equals the
diﬀerence of the marginal searching time increase between another lot being used and that lot, and thus
the optimal price change is negatively related to its own real-time occupancy (assuming the searching time
function is convex, as discussed in Section 2.4). In other words, if a lot is used during a time period in
its optimal ﬂow allocation, then the change in the optimal parking price should go down as the occupancy
increases (while the price still goes up). This is because now providing occupancy information to travelers
can also eﬀect travelers’ parking choice, setting the price too high may otherwise prevent the facility being
fully used.
Equation 32 indicates that the parking price and the provision of parking information jointly serve as
eﬀective ways of managing traﬃc. The parking price alone may not be as much eﬃcient, because the
cruising time, as a key component of the generalized travel cost, is not considered and cannot be aﬀected by
the price alone. While the real-time occupancy (or the estimated cruising time) conveys the information of
parking congestion level, it also eﬀectively adjusts travelers’ parking choices in real time. With information
provision, parking price is not the only economic manner to manage the traﬃc. The parking price and the
information provision should be balance out and work jointly for the best system performance.
Lemma 4.5.1 shows that any two parking lots cannot be used by travelers between more than one O-D
pairs at any time, unless the composite travel time follows a special (and rare) relationship. In most of the
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cases where dirs − d jrs  dir′ s′ − d jr′ s′ for ∀r, r′, s, s′, i, j, it is very unlikely that travelers from diﬀerent O-D
pairs share the more than one parking lots at the same time. The only exception is that their perceived
travel time diﬀerence between the most preferred two lots are approximately the same. This diﬀerence can
be understood as the measurement of their preference to the two lots based on their roadway travel time.
However, it is possible that travelers with the same O-D choose multiple parking lots at the same time. They
make tradeoﬀ between the parking preference, parking prices and the estimated parking congestion.
The results described in Proposition 4.5.1 are appealing. Any optimal parking ﬂow pattern can be
achieved by a lot-based parking pricing scheme. This nice feature makes the SO parking pricing scheme
easy to implement. Because the parking price and the occupancy is a one-to-one mapping, each lot can
set the the optimal real-time parking pricing based on the real-time occupancy, without necessarily tracking
the origins and destinations of parking demand. This provides a strong support that optimal parking prices
and information provision are able to eﬀectively manage the traﬃc. When the roadway congestion on the
arterials are relatively small compared to the parking cruising time, the lot-based time-varying parking prices
are fully capable of adjusting travelers’ route choices and parking choices in its optimal form. However, the
dynamic prices set on the lots may not be able to fully eliminate heavy roadway congestion, and this deserves
further investigation in future research.
5. Numerical experiments
In this section, we provide two numerical experiments to quantitatively examine the eﬀectiveness of the
optimal lot-based parking prices. We shall compare the parking patterns obtained from both UE and SO,
with their corresponding system performance. We adopt the searching time function proposed and calibrated
by Axhausen et al. (1994) and Horni et al. (2012).
We ﬁrst choose a two-origin-two-destination synthetic parking network. The small network is used
to particularly explain the relations between parking prices, occupancy and the optimal pattern. This can
provide additional insights besides the mathematical derivation. The second example is a general parking
network of Stanford University campus. We use this example to show the optimal parking ﬂow, and its focus
is to provide optimal parking pricing scheme in real networks and illustrate its improvement in network
performance compared to UE.
5.1. A synthetic two-origin-two-destination parking network
A synthetic two-origin-two-destination parking network is shown in Figure 4. Nodes 3 and 4 are the
origin nodes, and nodes 5 and 6 are the destination nodes. Travelers are between four O-D pairs in this
parking network, and they choose from the two parking lots, Lots 1 and 2. The driving time and walking
time are marked in the ﬁgure (in the unit of seconds). We suppose node 5 is a central business district (CBD),
which attracts 80% of the demand from nodes 3 and 4, while the rest heads for the other destination, node
6, a farther oﬃce area. Lot 1 is close to the CBD area with 800 spaces, and Lot 2 is close to the node 6 with
800 spaces as well. Clearly, Lot 1 is more preferable by demand from node 3 (also most of the travelers)
than Lot 2, while Lot 2 is preferred by demand from node 4. To simulate the traﬃc demand in the rush
hours, we synthesize a trapezoidal-shaped demand for both nodes 3 and 4. Assuming both origins nodes
are residential areas with the same size, their demands are the same, i.e., 50, 100, 150, 150, 100, 50 in six
45-min time periods. Therefore, 960 travelers who head for node 5 prefer Lot 2, and only 240 travelers who
head for node 6 prefer Lot 2, if the parking fees charged on both lots are equal. The value of time α is one
cent per second, and the parameter ε for the searching time function 3 is 30 seconds.
We ﬁrst assume the parking fees charged on both lots are constant for the UE case. The parking fee of
Lot 2 is set to $2. Without loss of generality, the fee of Lot 2 changes from $2.1 to $10, just to examine the
eﬀect of the parking price. The convergence criteria is set to the value of the gap function 8 is smaller than
0.001, or the maximum 1,000 iteration (for the projection-based algorithm), whichever comes ﬁrst. The
results of UE with respect to the constant parking fee of Lot 1 under UE are shown in Figure 5.
As the parking fee of Lot 1 increases from $2.1 to $10, the composite travel time cost ﬁrst stays ap-
proximately constant around $8400 until the fee of $6, and further on increases signiﬁcantly to $9600, by
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Fig. 4. A synthetic two-origin-two-destination parking network
(a) Total travel cost vs. parking fee of Lot 1 (b) Terminal occupancy vs. parking fee of Lot 1
Fig. 5. The results of UE with respect to the constant parking fee of Lot 1
14%, when the price achieves $10. The total cruising time cost is at a smaller magnitude compared to the
composite travel time cost, it attains its minimal when the price of Lot 1 is set to around $6.1. The total
travel cost almost follows the same proﬁle as the composite travel time cost. When the parking fee of Lot
1 is still low enough to attract most of the travelers to park in it, the total travel cost is nearly stable and
slightly decreasing as the price goes up, thanks to the reduction of cruising time cost. In this range, increas-
ing the parking fee of the central area can eﬀectively reduce the cruising time and thus the total travel cost.
However, when the price is set to beyond $6.5, all travelers would prefer to park in Lot 2. In this case, the
parking demand to Lot 2 is so intensive that it creates additional cruising time cost, while its total travel
time cost could also increase due to the inconvenience of using Lot 2. This is also reﬂected by the changes
in terminal occupancy in both lots. The terminal occupancy reduces from 0.9 to 0.6 for Lot 1 as the Lot
1 price goes up, and meanwhile the terminal occupancy in Lot 2 increases from 0.65 to 0.9. Overall, if
we charge a constant parking fee in the closer Lot, then $6.1 is the best. The resultant cruising time cost,
composite travel time cost and total travel time cost are $8702, $1997, and $10699. The reason it works
best in terms of the system cost is because it balances the demand between Lots 1 and 2. Their respective
terminal occupancies (around 0.85 and 0.7 for Lots 1 and 2,respectively) are medium for the entire range
of Lot 1 prices. At this price, the cruising time is minimal, while travelers can still take advantage of the
convenience of Lot 1 (spaces are used by 85%).
Later on, we choose the constant price $4 and $8 as typical UE cases to compare with the SO solution.
The former (UE case 1) represents the case where the price on the preferred lot is relatively low and the
preferred lot is in short of supply, while the latter (UE case 2) is a typical case with over-priced fee on the
preferred lot and the it is not eﬃciently used.
We now solve the optimal terminal occupancies, SO total parking ﬂow, SO parking ﬂow pattern and SO
prices sequentially. Under SO, the best terminal occupancy for Lots 1 and 2 is 87.5% and 62.5% (namely
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700 spots and 500 spots in total), respectively. Although the SO terminal occupancies are fairly close to the
UE case 1 where Lot 1 is priced at $4, the UE case 1 is far away from being optimal in total travel cost, as
well as its ﬂow pattern. The SO total parking ﬂow are that of the two UE cases are summarized as in Table
1.
Table 1. The total parking ﬂow for the SO and two UE cases
Solution type Lot 1 Lot 23-5 4-5 3-6 4-6 3-5 4-5 3-6 4-6
SO 220 480 0 0 260 0 120 120
UE p2 = $4 307 398 0 0 173 82 120 120
p2 = $8 88 480 0 0 392 0 120 120
In all those cases, the travelers heading for node 6 (outside of CBD) always choose the farther lot (Lot
2) as it is more convenient and less costly for them. When Lot 1 is under-priced (over-used), some travelers
from node 4 heading for the CBD may use the less convenient lot (Lot 2). Meanwhile, travelers from node
3 heading for the CBD are more likely to choose the preferred lot than in the SO pattern, though it is subject
to greater parking congestion than being optimal. In contrast, if Lot 1 is over-priced (under-used), it is those
travelers departing from node 3 and heading for the CBD who are aﬀected most compared to the SO. They
are more likely to choose the farther lot rather than the preferred lot (Lot 1). After all, for travelers heading
for CBD, the optimal usage of parking spaces are such that all those from node 4 use the preferred lot, as
it is more preferable than Lot 1 is to travelers from node 3. Under SO, 46% travelers from node 3 use the
preferred lot, and the rest 54% use the less convenient one.
(a) Lot 1 (b) Lot 2
Fig. 6. The parking ﬂow patterns of SO and the two UE cases
The parking ﬂow patterns obtained from SO and the two UE cases are plot in Figure 6, where the time
axle is with respect to the arrival time to the lot. SO keeps up approximately the same terminal occupancy as
the UE case 1 where the preferred lot is under-priced, but its arrival rates are milder and close to a constant
arrival rate over time. This indicates that under SO, the preferred lot is priced relatively high compared to
the less convenient lot in the ﬁrst place, but not to the level as in the UE case 2. When the parking demand
starts to drop, it is then priced relatively low to attract travelers and to ensure it is used eﬃciently fully
up to the optimal terminal occupancy. This conclusion is consistent with Arnott and Rowse (1999); Qian
et al. (2012). In those papers, it is suggested that inward parking preference (parking fee is priced such that
the farther lot is ﬁrst preferred and the closer lot is preferred in later stages of the commuting time) yields
system optimal. Overall, the SO price should be set properly to produce the terminal occupancy with certain
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amount of available spots in the preferred lot (12.5% in this case). Such an SO terminal occupancy should
be less than the one with under-priced parking fee in the preferred lot (UE case 2), which also supports
Shoup’s parking pricing theory (Shoup, 2005).
Last but not least, the composite travel time cost, cruising time cost and total travel cost resulted from
the SO pattern is $8,232, $2,203 and $10,435, respectively. The total travel cost is a 3% reduction of the best
constant parking price on Lot 1 (where the three numbers are $8,702, $1,997 and $10,699, respectively).
Comparing the two cases, the SO solution increases the cruising time slightly, while it yields the minimal
composite travel time. Overall, SO leads to the best system performance. Note that the percentage reduction
of total travel cost is on the basis of the composite travel time. The composite travel time here is a relative
number among travelers (omitting their travel time on the freeway). For instance, it can be subtracted or
inﬂated by the same amount of time. Thus, the reduction percentage can vary considerably as we assign
diﬀerent composite travel time (while the diﬀerence remains the same), but still yield the same ﬂow pattern.
The time-varying SO parking prices and the resultant cumulative occupancy are shown in Figure 7. The
criteria G(·) (Equation 29) we use to select the SO price from the SO solution set is E = InT and e = 5,
namely, we want to set the base price in Lot 1 to $5. In addition, we also add an additional constrain that pi(t)
is never decreasing over time1. We see that the preferred lot is then always priced at $4.8 over time (except
the ﬁrst few minutes), while the optimal price of the farther lot (Lot 2) starts at 0 (free) in the beginning.
As time goes on, the price gradually increases in Lot 2, and it grows faster. The SO prices are such that it
favors the farther one by under-pricing the preferred lot in the ﬁrst place. The farther lot should then be price
higher to encourage travelers to use the closer lot at the later stages of the commuting time. Finally, both lots
are priced approximately the same at $4.8. That is exactly the reason why the SO price of Lot 2 increases
dramatically once its occupancy hits 50%. The SO prices for Lot 2 is an increasing function (convex) of its
occupancy. The optimal price-occupancy diagram, as shown in Figure 7(b), can be used for both lots to set
the real-time prices, solely based on the real-time occupancy.
(a) Optimal price vs. Time (b) Optimal price vs. occupancy
Fig. 7. SO parking prices and the resultant occupancy
5.2. A parking network of Stanford University campus
Now we choose a real parking network on the campus of Stanford University. There are 7 major parking
lots located on the western campus, S-1, S-2, L-17, L-21, L-27, L-29 and L-18/20. The locations of the
parking lots and the traﬃc analysis zones (A,B,C,D) are shown in Figure 8. The capacities of the lots are
shown in Table 3. Of all the lots, S-1 and S-2 are the closest to the central campus, and is generally preferred
by all travelers (also most congested during a regular weekday currently). The four zones represent the four
1This constrain may not hold for other parking networks
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destinations where the majority of the traﬃc demand go from the western entrance of the campus. We rarely
observe any roadway congestion on campus, so our model would ﬁt well for this parking network.
Currently, all lots are available for commuters with certain parking permits. There are a small fraction
of spaces equipped with meters that are designated for visitors. The parking fee of a lot we use for this
experiment is the average daily cost of the permits allowed for that lot. The fees are $6, $4, $2, $4, $2,
$2, $2, respectively. We also collected 15-min traﬃc count data from the four major inbound arterials,
northern entrance, northwestern entrance, western entrance, and southwestern entrance. The four inbound
arterials are considered as the four origin nodes in this parking network. The driving time and walking time
is estimated approximately based on the distance measured in Google Maps. In addition, the time horizon
for this analysis is 7:00am-10:00am.
Fig. 8. A parking network of Stanford University campus
The traﬃc demand of the four entrances of the campus is shown in Table 2. As can be seen, the traﬃc in-
creases quickly after 7:00am and almost levels oﬀ from 7:30am -9:30am. Finally, it reduces a bit at 10:00am.
We further assume the proportions of travelers heading for each of the four campus zones (destinations) are
4:2:4:1. The proportions are inferred based on a rough estimation of the oﬃce/classroom densities.
Other parameters of the network are: The value of time α is set to $35 per hour (approximately the
average hourly pay rate on campus); ε for the searching time function 3 is set to 30 seconds; The convergence
criteria for UE is set to the value of the gap function 8 is smaller than 0.005. In addition, the criteria G(·)
(Equation 29) we use to select the SO price from the SO solution set is E = InT and e = 4OnT (i.e. the
expected average parking price is $4 for the entire network).
We solved both UE (using aforementioned pre-determined parking prices) and SO on this parking net-
work. The terminal occupancies are shown in Table 3. Compared to the UE (which is close to the currently
parking ﬂow pattern), SO assigns less travelers for all lots except the Lot L-18/20 and S-1. Since both S-1
and S-1 are preferred by most travelers for their superior convenience, they should be used nearly 95%
under SO as a balance of convenience and great cruising time. This number is very close to the UE case
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Table 2. The traﬃc demand of the four entrances of campus
Period (15min) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Southwestern 120 154 144 183 161 172 156 142 158 149 121 102
Western 64 92 138 116 84 98 117 97 106 99 75 48
Northwestern 43 67 46 49 41 63 56 73 62 61 61 40
Northern 79 91 126 120 102 132 116 116 93 114 100 74
(also the current case). The SO solution would direct travelers using all the other lots (except S-1) to Lot
L-18/20 in the optimal ﬂow pattern. This reduces the occupancies of those lots by 1% - 12% (except minor
0.6% increase for S-1), and ensures more eﬃcient usage of Lot L-18/20 with a terminal occupancy 57%, an
increase by 11%. Lot L-18/20 is the least convenient lot overall, but it is currently a bit over-priced, at the
same price as Lot 17, L-27 and L-29. Under SO, it should be used by more travelers, and those shifting to
it can beneﬁt from less cruising time and paying much smaller fee.
Table 3. The terminal occupancies of the seven parking lots
S-1 S-2 L-17 L-21 L-27 L-29 L-18/20
Capacity 1080 736 505 188 173 254 708
Occ of UE Spots 1018 707 482 181 169 248 328Percentage 94.3% 96.1% 95.5% 96.1% 97.8% 97.8% 46.3%
Occ of SO Spots 1025 697 463 179 148 221 402Percentage 94.9% 94.8% 91.4% 95.0% 95.0% 85.7% 56.7%
The optimal total parking ﬂow is shown in Table 4. We can easily verify that there do not exist any two
O-D pairs that use more than one parking lot during the entire time horizon.
Table 4. The optimal total parking ﬂow: a list of O-D pairs with positive parking ﬂow
S-1 S-2 L-17 L-21 L-27 L-29 L-18/20
1, 2, 3, 4→ B 1→ A 1→ C 1→ C
1→ A 1, 3, 4→ C 2, 3→ C 4→ C 1→ D 2, 3, 4→ D 1, 2, 3→ A
4→ D
The optimal parking ﬂow pattern is shown in Figure 9. The real-time occupancy for all the seven lots, as
a result of the SO pricing, should increase almost linearly as time goes on and ﬁnally achieves the optimal
terminal occupancy. The ﬂow patterns of Lot S-1 and L-18/20 (the two garages with greatest changes) under
both SO and UE are shown in Figure 10. Compared to UE, Lot S-1 should be priced in the way that it is
used more mildly between 8:00am to 9:00, and used more intensively afterword. Therefore, we should set
a relatively higher price between 8:00am to 9:00am then the UE case, and lower price after 9:00am. Under
UE, Log L-18/20, the least convenient one, is not used til 8:45am. However, the SO pricing ensures it is
used from the beginning of the commuting time with a milder arrival rate overall.
A possible set of optimal parking prices and its relation to the real-time occupancy are shown in Figure
11. Between 7:00am and 8:30am, the prices are set to $5, $5, $3, $5, $1.5, $1.5, and 0, respectively. After
8:30am, the optimal time-varying prices increase with time, and with occupancy as well, except for Lot S-1
and S-2 with approximately constant price at $6. Between 8:30am and 9:30am, we would expect to price the
Lots L-17/21/27/29 higher than in the UE case, so that a fraction of travelers can shift to use Lot L-18/20.
After 9:30am, the SO pricing then under-prices Lots S-1 and S-2 to ensure they are used eﬃciently since
they both are over-priced before 9:00am. At the end of the commuting time, all the lots are priced the same
at $5.5. Note that the optimal parking prices resulted from the optimization problem 30 may not necessarily
be smooth. The small spikes in the ﬁgure are due to the necessary pricing conditions between certain O-D
pairs and certain time periods, to achieve the SO ﬂow pattern. The smoothness can be further improved by
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Fig. 9. The optimal parking ﬂow pattern
(a) Lot S-1 (b) Lot S-2
Fig. 10. The time-varying parking ﬂow for Lot S-1 and S-2 under SO and UE
adjusting the prices locally satisfying the required conditions 27, thanks to the fact that the SO prices are
not unique.
Last but not least, the composite travel time cost, cruising time cost and total travel time cost of UE
is $8,070, $1,751 and $9,821, respectively. The three numbers for SO are $7,766, $1,556 and $9,322,
respectively. We see that the SO reduces both the composite travel time and cruising time considerably.
The SO saves the total travel cost $498, by 5%. The savings are signiﬁcant and the SO parking prices are
eﬃcient.
6. Conclusions
This paper investigates dynamic parking prices and provision of parking information to travelers for
a general parking network. Travelers are aware of the real-time parking occupancy and real-time parking
prices for all lots in the network. The real-time parking information helps traveler make time-varying park-
ing choices to minimize their individual generalized travel cost. The dynamic parking prices and cruising
(or searching) time are regarded as key components of the generalized travel cost. In the general parking
network, each parking lot/block could be used by demands associated with multiple origins and multiple
destinations.
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(a) Optimal price vs. Time (b) Optimal price vs. Occupancy
Fig. 11. A set of optimal parking prices
We ﬁrst formulate the parking choices under the UE conditions and solve it using the Variational In-
equality (VI) approach. Given that the cruising time function is strictly monotone, we show that the UE
ﬂow pattern exists and is unique for any pre-determined time-varying parking prices. A projection-based
algorithm is then proposed to solve the VI problem with guaranteed convergence to the UE solution. More
importantly, we solve for the system optimal (SO) ﬂow pattern and SO parking prices which minimizes the
total system cost. The SO solutions involves three sequential steps, solving the optimal terminal parking
occupancy, optimal total parking ﬂow for the entire analysis time horizon, and the optimal parking ﬂow
pattern with respect to time. We show that the optimal terminal parking occupancies for the lots exist and
are unique, and they can be obtained by solving a standard traﬃc assignment problem in the general parking
network. The SO parking ﬂow pattern is, however, not unique. This oﬀers suﬃcient ﬂexibility for operators
to achieve diﬀerent management objectives while keeping the ﬂow pattern optimal. The SO ﬂow pattern is
formulated as a large-scale linear program. Large-scale iterative algorithms methods for solving rectangular
systems can be applied here to solve the linear program eﬃciently, such as LSQR or LSMR. Note that we
do not explicitly model the roadway congestion when travelers choosing the parking lots, but the SO prices
can be carefully chosen to produce constant arrival rates to each lot over time. This can reduce the potential
roadway congestion and queuing due to cruising.
To achieve the optimal ﬂow pattern, the optimal parking prices do not necessarily need to be path-based.
Rather, any optimal ﬂow pattern can be realized by a lot-based parking pricing scheme that only depends
on the time or occupancy. Thus, the optimal parking prices are realistic and easy to implement in the real
world. We further formulate the optimal parking prices as a large-scale linear program. Finally, the optimal
parking prices with respect to the real-time occupancy can be therefore obtained.
Under the SO pricing, the change in the optimal parking price should go down as the occupancy increases
(as long as the lot is used during that time period in its optimal ﬂow pattern). This is because now providing
occupancy information to travelers can also eﬀect travelers’ parking choice, setting the price too high may
otherwise prevent the facility being fully used. In addition, the optimal price change is equal to the marginal
searching time of another lot being used during this time period. During this time interval, a lot with less
occupancy is assigned with more travelers. We also show that under SO, any two parking lots cannot be used
by travelers between more than one O-D pairs at any time. The only exception is that travelers’ perceived
travel time diﬀerence between the most preferred two lots are approximately the same for any two O-D
pairs.
We ﬁnd that both the information provision and parking prices jointly serve as the eﬃcient way of
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managing the traﬃc. The parking price alone may not be as much eﬃcient, because the cruising time, as a
key component of the generalized travel cost, is not aﬀected by the optimal parking price alone. While the
real-time occupancy (or the estimated cruising time) conveys the information of parking congestion level, it
also eﬀectively adjusts travelers parking choices in real time. With information provision, parking price is
not the only economic manner to manage the traﬃc. The parking price and the information provision should
be balance out and work jointly for the best result.
We ﬁnally apply our UE and SO formulations and solution algorithms to two numerical examples, a
synthetic two-origin-two-destination network and a real parking network of Stanford University campus.
The results are intriguing. The best system performance is achieved by the parking prices such that the
more preferred (convenient) lot should be used fully up to a certain terminal occupancy, meanwhile not too
intensively. Around 5%-10% spaces in the preferred lot are expected to be available for the SO case, as a
way to balance the cruising time and convenience of preferred lots. Those lots with less convenience should
be used more eﬃciently under SO. In addition, the parking prices for the preferred lot are usually priced
relatively high in the beginning of the commuting time, and later on priced relatively low as time goes on.
This leads to mild (close to constant) arrival rates to the lots over the entire analysis horizon, which mitigates
the potential queuing, cruising and roadway congestion.
Our future research will ﬁrst focus on the calibration of UE model and searching time functions using
real parking data on Stanford campus. We can furthermore consider more generic parking networks with
explicit models of roadway congestions. Although this may not yield analytical formulations and solu-
tions, it could be useful for designs of both roadway pricing and parking pricing. We are also interested
in developing a variety of parking management objectives F(·) and pricing objectives G(·) for a more real-
istic implementation of the optimal pricing schemes. Time-varying step parking prices with respect to the
occupancy would be of particular interest for parking operators.
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